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Abstract:
When ranking big data observations such as colleges in the United States, diverse
consumers reveal heterogeneous preferences. The objective of this paper is to sort out
a linear ordering for these observations and to recommend strategies to improve their
relative positions in the ranking. A properly sorted solution could help consumers
make the right choices, and governments make wise policy decisions. Previous re-
searchers have applied exogenous weighting or multivariate regression approaches to
sort big data objects, ignoring their variety and variability. By recognizing the diver-
sity and heterogeneity among both the observations and the consumers, we instead
apply endogenous weighting to these contradictory revealed preferences. The out-
come is a consistent steady-state solution to the counterbalance equilibrium within
these contradictions. The solution takes into consideration the spillover effects of
multiple-step interactions among the observations. When information from data is
efficiently revealed in preferences, the revealed preferences greatly reduce the volume
of the required data in the sorting process. The employed approach can be applied
in many other areas, such as sports team ranking, academic journal ranking, voting,
and real effective exchange rates.
Keywords: revealed preference; authority distribution; endogenous weighting; college
ranking; big data; matching game; sort; counterbalance equilibrium
JEL Codes: C68, C71, C78, D57, D58, D74
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1 Introduction
The problem we address here relates to the following typical situation: millions of
consumers face hundreds of alternatives when making decisions. Each alternative is
of significant complexity and variety. From an affordable and pre-selected shortlist,
a consumer picks just one alternative, thus revealing some preference over others on
the shortlist. Our objective is to sort all of these alternatives according to revealed
preferences. One concrete context is to rank the colleges in the United States, where
each student selects only one college to attend when admitted by multiple institutions.
The results in this paper arise from two considerations. On the one hand, college
ranking is of broad public interest. The consumers are not only students and their
families but also governments that aim to rationalize their allocation of funding as
well as college administrators who are interested in comparing their ranking to peer
institutions on a national level. Alumni pay attention to similar comparisons, and
leading companies prefer to hire graduates from the best colleges. As a consequence,
there are dozens of college rankings in the U.S. market, including those published
by mainstream media, such as U.S. News & World Report, Washington Monthly,
the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), Time, and Forbes. As indicated by many researchers
(e.g., Bastedo and Bowman, 2010 and 2011), these rankings have demonstrable effects
on potential students and administrators due to their perceived influence on resource
providers. On the other hand, however, almost all these rankings rely on some preset
weighting system using merely several criteria, such as acceptance rates, standardized
test scores, alumni donation rates, and class sizes. The weights are then applied to
each college to obtain a ranking score. The selection of criteria and the weights are
subjective; a slight variation leads to a different ranking result. A consequence of this
methodology is an isomorphism: the diversity of the higher educational institutions
are not valued. Many researchers have claimed such rankings often harm higher
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education (e.g., Craig, 2015; Moed, 2017; Perez-Pena and Slotnik, 2012).
Our solution to the problem is to apply authority distribution (Hu and Shapley,
2003) to the revealed preferences by the students. We believe there exists no exoge-
nous weighting system applicable to all colleges. Each college is unique, and just a
few measurements cannot accurately portray it. For example, a liberal arts college
and an engineering-focused college could value SAT scores and faculty publications
quite differently. The characteristics of a college are embodied in the applicants in
general, and the admitted students in particular. We remove the subjective weighting
systems and ignore the criteria selection. However, we believe each consumer could
have his or her specific weighting on a much broader set of criteria, including qualita-
tive and latent ones. A student could have dozens of other considerations, such as the
distance from home, tuition, sports, job and internship potential, personal connec-
tions, campus visit experience, and median salary after graduation —far beyond the
few criteria listed in mainstream media. Personal considerations and weighting are
effectively revealed in his or her preference when selecting one college and rejecting
others. Identifying logical and consistent inferences from these personal preferences
is the main challenge. Hu and Shapley (2003) partially overcomes the challenge and
also includes a simple college ranking using artificial data. In this paper, we build a
detailed roadmap to get around the obstacles in ranking colleges.
The approach has three advantages. First, we allow heterogeneity from the con-
sumers as well as from the colleges. We use a massive endogenous weighting scheme to
avoid any subjective weighting and criteria selection. Secondly, our method is robust.
We use revealed preferences as a dimensionality reduction mechanism —each prefer-
ence could have taken into consideration countless selection criteria, and the ranking
uses preferences from millions of households. Additionally, our ranking considers long-
term and system-wide influences by aggregating spillover effects from direct bilateral
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influences. Thirdly, the specific application to the game-theoretic authority distribu-
tion respects individual rationality and values collective welfare. It seamlessly links
authority distribution with revealed preference, heterogeneity, big data, endogenous
weighting, strategyproofness, and public interests in college ranking. Furthermore,
we envision many potential applications in other fields. As a consequence of these ad-
vantages, we believe our ranking methodology is more authoritative than those used
in the popular rankings.
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 summarizes the
critical issues in other rankings and introduces the new sorting methodology, which
integrates the revealed preference with the authority distribution framework. Section
3 analyzes the data, calculates the ranking scores, and simulates their confidence in-
tervals. Next, Section 4 discusses a few properties of the ranking method. Notably,
we address strategies to improve ranking scores. Section 5 studies an empirical rank-
ing using real data. In Sections 6, we discuss vulnerabilities, extensions, and other
applications of the framework. Finally, we conclude in Section 7. Our exposition is
self-contained, and the proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Methodology
Before our formal discussion, we introduce a few notations. Let N = {1,2, · · · ,n}
denote the set of colleges in the United States, indexed as 1,2, ...,n. In the time
frame of one academic year, let Ai be the number of students admitted by college i.
Out of the Ai admitted students, N˜ij students would attend college j ∈ N. We use a
multinomial distribution to model these random numbers N˜ij , using the parameters
Ai and (Pi1, · · · ,Pin). The probability Pij is the likelihood that anyone in Ai would
enroll in college j. Of course, the student is also admitted by college j. We write
matrix P = [Pij ] , i, j = 1,2, · · · ,n. After the admission and acceptance process has
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been completed, we observe a N˜ii, which is the number of enrolled students, denoted
by Ei. For j 6= i, however, N˜ij are generally not observable at this time or thereafter.
The data Ai and Ei are available from many sources, including the National Center
for Education Statistics (NCES) and the Common Data Set (CDS) for these colleges.
2.1 Key Issues in Popular Rankings
Of the dozens of popular college rankings in the United States, each uses several crite-
ria to weight the colleges and calculate a weighted score for each college. For example,
the following seven criteria drove the U.S. News & World Report’s college ranking (
U.S. News) in 2019: Graduation and Retention Rates (22.5%), Undergraduate Aca-
demic Reputation (22.5%), Faculty Resources (20%), Student Selectivity (12.5%),
Financial Resources (10%), Graduation Rate Performance (7.5%), and Alumni Giv-
ing Rate (5%). This weighting system raises several questions: Why are other criteria
not included? How were the weights determined? How do we measure qualitative
variables such as selectivity and reputation? Also, “giving rates” and “resources”
data are vulnerable to manipulation.
A generic recipe for these rankings is as follows. Let there be k criteria, wj be the
weight on the jth criterion, and xji be college i’s score on the jth criterion. These
rankings use
(w1, · · · ,wk)

x11 . . . x1n
...
...
...
xk1 . . . xkn
=
 k∑
j=1
wjxj1, · · · ,
k∑
j=1
wjxjn
 (1)
to calculate a ranking score
k∑
j=1
wjxji for college i. The ranking scores on the right
side of (1) are then used to sort the colleges. Variants of criteria and their weights
can produce quite different ranks for the same college. Table 1 is an example: the
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Table 1: Ranks for the Same College: the UCLA Case∗
U.S. News Business WSJ / Washington
Source ARWU Forbes Best Colleges Insider Times HE Monthly
Rank 9 31 19 22 12 8
U.S. News Princeton Avery et al.
Source QS Niche Global Universities Review (2013) Parchment
Rank 16 26 9 5 28 18
* : ARWU and QS for Academic Ranking of World Universities and Quacquarelli Symonds, resp.
* : From websites cited in the reference, accessed 18 March 2019.
* : Liberal arts colleges and military academies are excluded.
lowest rank of 31 for UCLA (University of California, Los Angeles) is six times more
than the highest rank of 5 for the same college.
However, these popular rankings have been widely criticized (e.g., Bruni, 2016;
Ehrenberg, 2005; Grewal, Dearden, and Lilien, 2008; Luca and Smith, 2011; Moed,
2017; Perez-Pena and Slotnik, 2012). Let us mention just a few reasons why. First,
the premise of these popular rankings —that a few criteria will produce a complete
comparison for all colleges— is not universally shared. It does not offer a realistic
scenario nor a good approximation of one. Each college has not only a unique location
but also unique features. Some , for example, focus on research while others on
teaching. Some are science- and engineering-based, while others are arts- and social
science-oriented. Secondly, these rankings hardly align with the selection criteria of
consumers. In particular, they ignore several vital concerns of prospective students,
such as the distance between college and home, campus life, sports, median post-
graduation starting salaries, location, and the number of graduate programs. Of
course, tuition and room and board are among the most significant concerns for
students who apply for education loans. All of these considerations are taken into
account when choosing one college out of many. Thirdly, these rankings inherit the
subjectivity and bias from a single model designed by a small committee of educators
and business people. For example, the weights wj in (1) are very subjective; many
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scores xji —such as academic prestige— are also subjective, and they are subject to
manipulation or inflation by colleges. Lastly, these criteria-based rankings discourage
institutional diversity and reinforce similarities among universities. If colleges were to
base their development plans on the U.S. News criteria in order to raise their ranks,
there might be little value in retaining programs such as sports.
A recent ranking by Avery et al. (2013) is worth highlighting. In their research,
they study several econometric models that describe the decision process by colleges
versus applicants. An extensive set of data was collected to estimate the unknown
weights in these models. The result is three sets of rankings. In contrast, we study
college versus college comparisons, using rejection and acceptance by the students as
the basis for comparison. We believe that sorting or ranking is about comparisons,
and anyone’s preference is already a ranking between two colleges by that individual.
Also, we argue that a constant coefficient in an econometric model cannot capture
the marginal effect for all schools or all students. If a regression model is used, then
its residual term accounts for the distinctive characteristics of a college or the unique
considerations of a student. Unfortunately, the residual term is generally treated as
random noise. Our new ranking method, in contrast, ingests every piece of recent
public information about a college, including any scandals and victories by the football
team, for example.
In contrast to (1), we write a deterministic decision function Fis(· · ·) for student
s’ choice yis on college i,
yis = Fis(x1,x2,x3, · · ·) (2)
where (x1,x2,x3, · · ·) is an indefinite list of all possible considerations for all of the
students. The big data (x1,x2,x3, · · ·) could include thousands of explanatory vari-
ables about the colleges. Being viewed as an observation of available data on the
Internet, a college could be as “big” as Harvard. However, these functions Fis(· · ·)
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are personal-specific and not identifiable, given the availability of the data. Similarly,
we could also define an indefinite-dimensional decision function for each college. Be-
cause of the dimensionality of (x1,x2,x3, · · ·) and the privacy of Fis(· · ·), some level
of data abstraction becomes indispensable to order the colleges from the best to the
worst. In the literature, however, there is hardly any research which targets sorting
big data objects, though many (e.g., Eeckhout, Pinheiro, and Schmidheiny, 2010 and
2014; Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Langville and Meyer, 2012) have sorted complicated
objects using spatial, network, or multidimensional analyses.
2.2 Revealed Preference
Revealed preference theory (cf. Samuelson, 1948) analyzes the actual choices by
individual consumers who have heterogeneous utility functions. An individual may
execute individual rationality or bounded individual rationality by maximizing his or
her utility function. Individual consumers may also demonstrate behavioral biases in
making their choices. Revealed preference, however, does not hold the axioms of a
utility function or a multi-person utility function (Baucells and Shapley, 2008). The
focus is on what choice yis individual s makes, not on how he or she makes the choice.
Thus, we ignore the personal decision function Fis(· · ·) and the explanatory variables
(x1,x2,x3, · · ·) in (2). The choice yis has considered them. Personal considerations,
however, play an essential role in making an individual choice. A typical practice for
a student is to compare one college with another without knowing or using any utility
function. Thus, a universally accepted set of considerations and decision functions
does not work for millions of high school seniors. In the literature, revealed preference
analysis had been used as an alternative to regression approaches (e.g., Chirinko and
Schaller, 2004; Pritchard, 2018; Tieskens et al., 2018).
By ignoring Fis(· · ·) and (x1,x2, · · ·), we transform the big data into a high-
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dimensional space of yis. In the transformation, the underlying assumption is that
personal preferences have adequately reflected the ignored data. A significant reason
for the assumption is the informational efficiency in the preference revelation. The ef-
ficiency is driven by the strong motivation of parents and students to acquire relevant
information. To gather that data, they might fly thousands of miles for a campus
visit or spend weeks in examining slight differences between two candidate colleges.
The efficiency is also due to the collective power to assemble and assimilate the in-
formation by millions of consumers, though an individual is influenced by emotional
biases and could make cognitive errors in processing the information.
Colleges vary significantly among the higher education system. A college is also a
rational decision-maker that admits the best students it can attract. Its preference is
effectively revealed in its admitted students. Accordingly, there exists no universally
accepted set of criteria for all these colleges. For example, a research-focused college
may have a different utility function, if there is any, from a teaching-oriented college.
A public university has to comply with specific enrollment mandates set by state
authorities. The mandates and public spending on higher education are also not ac-
knowledged in the rankings by mainstream media. Admission procedures vary among
colleges. Unlike the idealized selection process stated in Gale and Shapley (1962), a
college cannot rank all of its applicants, and it generally offers more admissions than
needed. It may establish a waiting list, and it may also offer early admissions and
scholarships in order to hold a repository of students who can no longer accept offers
from other schools.
In the many-to-many matching game between the students and the colleges, pref-
erence is officially revealed at least three times. First, a student files applications to
a shortlist of pre-selected schools, ignoring any unfavorite or unfit ones. A student
could take years to observe and consider the shortlist before filing applications. Pref-
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erence is revealed a second time when a college admits potential students who satisfy
the standards of the college. A college admission officer also considers enrollment size
and diversity of the admitted students. In the last stage, the student decides on his
or her favorite school and rejects all others.
Lastly, these revealed preferences are contradictory; they offer no utility function
nor any linear ordering of the alternatives. Indeed, neither students nor parents use
a utility function or an econometric model to make decisions. They make pairwise
comparisons. Nevertheless, we cannot apply any comparison sorting algorithms for
arrays, such as Quicksort or Heapsort; revealed preferences also show how much one
alternative is preferred over another (cf. Table 3). This paper applies authority
distribution to combine these conflicting preferences, which gradually spills over the
direct influence among all colleges. The evolution of the spillover effects eventually
smooths out all conflicts among the preferences. The infinite-step evolution process
can be simplified by solving a counterbalance equilibrium equation in (3).
2.3 Authority Distribution
In the context of authority distribution, there is a network of multiple players. These
players have a direct influence, broadly called power, over each other. For each player,
the network constitutes a “command game” by the direct influence on the player. To-
gether, there are n command games that describe the power-in-and-out dynamics
in the network. When the players are sufficiently connected, there exists a general
equilibrium, called counterbalance equilibrium, which is the steady-state solution for
the power flow dynamics. A player derives authority from others, whom he directly
influences. When we apply authority distribution to sort the U.S. higher education
institutions, the players are the colleges. The direct influence could be, for example,
the acceptance and rejection by prospective students, sports, faculty recruitment, re-
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search fund competition, and publication cross-citation. In this paper, we focus solely
on the preferences of potential students who make rational choices after observing the
other aspects of influence; we argue that consumers’ choices make the most compre-
hensive interactions when comparing two choices. In the literature, researchers (e.g.,
Bastedo and Bowman, 2011; Correntea, Grecoa, and Lowinskic, 2018; Grewal, Dear-
den, and Lilien, 2008) have also recognized the interdependence of institutions when
evaluating colleges.
For college i, for example, its pool of admitted students and their choices constitute
a game of foot voting in which students’ preferences are explicitly exercised through
their actions of acceptance or rejection, i.e., yis. In this student-college matching,
dollar voting is part of the foot voting, as tuition is a significant concern for parents
and student borrowers. Ironically, by excluding tuition in their criteria, mainstream
media ignore one of the most salient issues among education consumers. Besides, the
pool itself represents college i’s characteristics: it could be competitive or not; it could
be small or large based on its enrollment size. Statistics about GPAs, standardized
test scores, and demographic data are already embedded in the pool of admitted
students.
Colleges i and j become rivals to compete in recruiting the shared pool of students
when their pools overlap. Each college has its rivals, and the number of rivals varies
across the higher education system. Additionally, two non-competing colleges may
have one or more common rivals, and three or more pools could also intersect (see
Figure 1(a)). Consequently, a competitive battlefield of such a shared pool could
involve many players.
For all the pools, the power transition matrix P collectively specifies the likelihood
of any student’s final choice after admission. As the proportion of students who decide
to attend college j, Pij measures college j’s direct influence or power in college i’s
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(a) Shared Pools of Admitted Students (b) Power Transition Dynamics
Figure 1: Interactions Among Colleges i, j, and k.
foot voting game. Asymmetry generally exists when Pij 6= Pji; thus, power flows from
one college to another unevenly. Figure 1(b) shows the bilateral power movement
among three colleges; each has a direct influence on the other two. Besides, when
aggregating yis to the matrix P , we further reduce the dimension of data.
Authority distribution associated with P is a row vector pi= (pi1,pi2, · · · ,pin) which
satisfies the counterbalance equilibrium
(pi1,pi2, · · · ,pin) = (pi1,pi2, · · · ,pin)P (3)
subject to the normalization condition
n∑
i=1
pii = 1 and positivity condition pii ≥ 0 for all
i ∈ N. We can see a direct influence from two aspects. For a specific i ∈ N, it derives
authority from others on whom it has a direct impact, i.e., by (3),
pii =
n∑
j=1
pijPji. (4)
Equation (4) describes how power flows from other players into i. It derives more
authority from influential players than from non-influential players, other things being
equal. Moreover, it also derives more authority from players on which it has a large
direct influence, other things being equal. In the second aspect, i also contributes
to other colleges that have direct influences on i. This can be seen from the power
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outflow equation
pik = piiPik +
∑
j 6=i
pijPjk. (5)
The larger Pik, the more college i contributes to college k’s authority. The inflow
power in (4) and outflow power in (5) eventually reach an equilibrium described by
(3). In essence, pi is a power index in the interactive and yet controversial network.
The derivation of the counterbalance equilibrium and the properties of pi were studied
in Hu and Shapley (2003). This distribution has been mostly used in social networks,
corporate networks, and controls (e.g., Crama and Leruth, 2007; Grabisch and Rusi-
nowska, 2010). Compared to Google’s PageRank (e.g., Langville and Meyer, 2012),
authority distribution drops the damping factor and has a stochastic matrix with a
non-zero diagonal.
3 Estimation
This section estimates P , pi, and its confidence interval, mean, and median.
3.1 The Data
All the data used to estimate P come from the Internet. With regard to sampling
errors, official admission data provide high precision to the diagonal elements of P
while online survey data cast more doubt on the off-diagonal ones.
3.1.1 The Official Enrollment Rates
The probability Pii is the likelihood that any student admitted by college i would
enroll in college i. We can estimate it by the enrollment rate
Pˆii =
Ei
Ai
. (6)
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Table 2: UCLA Fall Admission Statistics 2013-2018∗
2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013
Applicants 113,779 102,242 97,115 92,728 86,548 80,522
Admits (Ai) 15,988 16,456 17,474 16,016 16,059 16,448
Enrolled (Ei) 6,240 6,038 6,545 5,679 5,764 5,697
* Source : www.wikipedia.org, accessed 1 January 2019.
The enrollment rates are available on many websites, including the CDS, the NCES,
Wikipedia, U.S. News, and those for colleges. Table 2 is an example of admission
statistics for UCLA between 2013 and 2018. In this table, UCLA admitted 15,988
of 113,779 applicants for fall 2018. Out of the admitted students, 6,240 enrolled at
UCLA. Thus, the enrollment rate was 6,24015,988 = 39.03% for 2018.
3.1.2 The Survey Data of Preference
When i 6= j, Pij is the percentage of students who are admitted by college i but decide
to attend college j. These data are not wholly available, so we estimate them from the
survey data of preference posted on Parchment, Niche, and similar websites. Many
students also post their decisions on online discussion boards. Table 3 lists a sample of
revealed preferences, described as odds ratios, for twelve colleges. These include seven
private universities and five public ones, often ranked highly by mainstream media.
At the ith row and jth column, the numerator is the percentage for college i and the
denominator for college j. For example, of the students admitted by both Harvard
and Stanford and deciding to attend either Harvard or Stanford, 44% choose Stanford,
and 56% Harvard. Also, the percentage 56% has the .95 confidence interval between
51.2% to 60.7%, listed on the Parchment website, and calculated by the Wilson score
method (Wilson, 1927). Similarly, the percentage 44% has the .95 confidence interval
between 39.3% to 48.8%. Of course, these students may also be admitted by other
schools.
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Table 3: Sample Revealed Preference Represented as Odds Ratios∗
HRD SFD Yale PRT MIT CCG CIT UCB Mich UCLA UVA
SFD 4456
Yale 3763
45
55
PRT 2476
30
70
33
67
MIT 3862
32
68
64
36
55
45
CCG 3070
32
68
24
76
38
62
26
74
CIT 1684
25
75
45
55
44
56
19
81
46
54
UCB 2080
10
90
10
90
16
84
14
86
20
80
24
76
Mich 1684
15
85
22
78
18
82
9
91
29
71
20
80
39
61
UCLA 1882
6
94
15
85
17
83
9
91
21
79
8
92
47
53
43
57
UVA 2575
13
87
21
79
6
94
17
83
13
87
13
87
36
64
56
44
48
52
UNC 2080
28
72
21
79
11
89
33
67
33
67
40
60
36
64
45
55
45
55
47
53
* HRD, SFD, PRT, CCG, CIT are for Harvard, Stanford, Princeton, Chicago, CalTech, resp.
* UCB and Mich are for University of California at Berkeley and University of Michigan, resp.
* UVA and UNC are for University of Virginia and University of North Carolina, resp.
* Source : www.parchment.com, accessed 1 November 2019.
Some simple conclusions could be reached by using only the data in Table 3.
First, column 1 shows that Harvard is preferred over all other colleges; a reasonable
ranking would place it before the others, regardless of the confidence intervals of or
the weights on the odds ratios. Secondly, we would expect Stanford to place second
since it is preferred over all others, except Harvard (cf. Column 2). It is also at the
top when Harvard acts as the reference (cf. Column 1). A further analysis implies
that MIT and Yale would compete for third place. They are preferred over all other
schools except Harvard and Stanford (cf. Columns 3 and 5). When either Harvard
or Standford acts as the reference (cf. Columns 1 and 2), they place higher than all
other schools except Stanford and Harvard, respectively.
However, there are a few data issues worth mentioning, as different odds ratios
come from different shared pools of students. First, the transitivity of preference does
not hold. For example, we could find a circular chain of preference, Mich 4 UVA 4
UCLA 4 Mich, when using the bilateral preferences only. Secondly, the ratios are not
multiplicative. For instance, UCLA 4 Mich by 4357 and UCLA 4 UCB by
47
53 does not
imply UCB 4 Mich by 5347
43
57 =
2,279
2,679 . On the contrary, Mich 4 UCB by
39
61 . Thirdly,
contradictory orderings exist if we compare colleges using different benchmarks. For
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example, if we use Harvard as the reference benchmark (cf. Column 1), then Mich 4
UCLA 4 UVA. But if we use UCB as the reference school (cf. Column 8), the ordering
is UVA 4 Mich 4 UCLA. If Harvard has more authority than UCB, then the first
ordering should be weighted more than the second one. Also, spatial adjacency plays
a crucial role in these odds ratios. In the seventh row, for example, Berkeley has the
lowest odds ratio versus Stanford, and its distance from Stanford is also the shortest.
A similar case is the seventh column, where UCLA has the lowest odds ratio against
CalTech, and the shortest distance from CalTech. Lastly, the odds ratios alone are
not enough to determine all Pij ; we are more interested in the number of students
who are admitted by college i but decide to go to college j.
3.2 Conditional Estimability of P
This subsection illustrates how to estimate Pij , conditional on Pii = EiAi and other
observations. Clearly, the enrollment rate EiAi is an unbiased estimate for Pii. Besides,
both Ei and Ai from the CDS and the NCES have an annual frequency. But the
preference survey data have a real-time frequency, and they likely come from multiple
years. In order to fix the frequency divergence, we assume that both the odds ratios
and the enrollment rates remain stable across multiple years.
To link the odds ratios in Table 3 to P , we capitalize on the confidence intervals
of the odds ratios. Out of the students who are admitted by both colleges i and
j and decide to attend either i or j, we let Sij be the likelihood a student would
choose college j. We also let Mij be the number of those students who participate
in the online preference survey and let sij be the proportion of the surveyed students
who decide on college j. Clearly, Mij = Mji and the odds ratio is 1−sijsij . We define
ωij = 2sijMij+z
2
2Mij+2z2 where z is the .975 percentile of the standard normal distribution.
Given sij and Mij , the .95 confidence interval for Sij , calculated by the Wilson score
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method, is
ωij ± z2Mij + 2z2
√
4sij(1−sij)Mij +z2. (7)
Replacing sij with EiAi andMij with Ai in (7), we obtain the Wilson confidence interval
for Pii. Given sij and the confidence interval (7), we can extract Mij by Lemma 1.
Alternatively, we can also extract Mij using sij and the confidence interval length
z
Mij+z2
√
4sij(1−sij)Mij +z2.
Lemma 1. Let τ = 1−sij and let η be the lower confidence bound in (7). Then
Mij =
τsij− (sij−η)(1−2η) +
√
[(sij−η)(1−2η)− τsij ]2 + 4η(1−η)(sij−η)2
2
(
sij−η
z
)2 .
Thus, Nij
def== sijMij is the number of students in the survey who are admitted
by college i but decide to attend college j. Consequently,
∑
k 6=i
Nik is the number of
students in the survey who are admitted by college i but decide not to attend college
i. This is about 1−Pii of the students in the survey who are admitted by college i, if
each student has the same likelihood to take the survey. Therefore, we estimate Pij
by
Pˆij
def== Nij∑
k 6=i
Nik
(
1− Ei
Ai
)
, j 6= i. (8)
As stated in Theorem 1, Pˆij is an unbiased estimate for Pij given Pii = EiAi , the size
of the survey data
∑
k 6=i
Nik, and certain reasonable assumptions.
Theorem 1 (Conditional Unbiasedness). Assume all students accepted by college i
have the same likelihood to independently participate in the preference survey. Then
E
Pˆij | Pii = Pˆii,∑
k 6=i
Nik
= Pij , ∀ j 6= i.
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As the breadth and size of each college differ significantly across the education
system, we mitigate the size effect in the enrollment without modifying the odds
ratios. The above estimation of Pij for all j 6= i is based on unequal sample sizes. The
size of Mij relies on the size of Aj , but Aj varies across all j 6= i. To make Pij and Pik
comparable roughly under a common sample size, we scale the length of the Wilson
confidence interval (7) by
√
Ej
max
k 6=i
Ek
, i.e., the scaled Wilson confidence interval is
ωij ± z2Mij + 2z2
√
4sij(1−sij)Mij +z2
√√√√ Ejmax
k 6=i
Ek
. (9)
Before the scaling, the length is of order O
(
1√
Mij
)
. After the scaling, it is of
O
(√
Ej
Mij
)
, ignoring the common denominator
√
max
k 6=i
Ek. If EjMij is close to a non-zero
constant as Ej→∞, then the length of the scaled interval is of O
(
1√
max
k 6=i
Ek
)
and the
common sample size is of O
(
max
k 6=i
Ek
)
. As Pij only counts the students enrolling in
college j, we use Ej in (9) to exclude the students who do not enroll in college j. Using
max
k 6=i
Ek guarantees that the scaled intervals (9) lie in (0,1). The scaling by a con-
stant is different from the actual increase of the sample size; the latter extracts more
information from new data and thus reduces the uncertainty in estimation. Scaling
by the square root of sample size is a common practice to balance the breadth and
depth, e.g., t-statistic with unequal sample size, the investor’s breadth, and Grinold
and Kahn (2011). In summary, Algorithm 1 estimates Pij when the enrollment sizes
Ej have a large variation:
3.3 Confidence Interval of pi
After estimating P , we solve the counterbalance equation pˆi = pˆiPˆ by Algorithm 2 ,
where 1n is the column vector with n ones. According to the theory of Markov chains,
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1. Calculate the Wilson interval (7) if it is not available;
2. Scale the Wilson confidence interval using (9);
3. Apply Lemma 1 to (9) to calculate the scaled Mij and Nij ;
4. Use the scaled Nij in (8) to calculate Pˆij .
Algorithm 1: Estimate Pij for j 6= i.
pi(t) converges if Pˆ satisfies certain properties specified in Theorem 3. After setting
the final pi(t) to pˆi, we sort the vector pˆi from the largest value to the least. The college
with the largest value ranks first, and the college with the least value ranks last.
pi(0)←− 1′n; pi(1)←− 1n1′n; t←− 1;
while ||pi(t)−pi(t−1)||∞ > 1e−9 do
t←− t+ 1;
pi(t)←− pi(t−1)Pˆ ;
end
Algorithm 2: Calculate pˆi from Pˆ .
The uncertainty of pˆi comes from the estimation of P . We can capitalize on the
Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the confidence interval of pˆi, by simulating 20,000
power transition matrices P . For each simulated P , we calculate a ranking score pˆi.
From these 20,000 sets of ranking scores pˆi, we extract the .95 confidence intervals
of pi, the mean and median ranking scores, and the .95 confidence intervals of ranks.
Algorithm 3 can be used to simulate a P . Note that each row of the simulated P
already sums to 1.
1. For each pair of (i, j), estimate a 2-parameter beta distribution using sij ,
Pˆii, Nij , and the Wilson intervals;
2. Use the beta distributions to simulate Sij and Pii for all i ∈ N and j < i.
For j > i, let Sij = 1−Sji;
3. Apply Algorithm 1 together with simulated Pii and sij = Sij to calculate
Pij whenever j 6= i.
Algorithm 3: Simulate a P .
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4 Properties of the Sorting
This section discusses a few properties of pi. Some of them relate to the theory of
homogeneous Markov chains. Hence, one could use the theory to find more properties.
Besides, we highlight a few ways to improve a college’s ranking score.
4.1 Endogenous Weighting
The explicit dimension of the matrix P is n. Moreover, each Pij is a result of choices
made by many students who are admitted by both colleges i and j; each student
considers an indefinite number of reasons which are not listed in Pij . For any i ∈ N,
we use college i as the benchmark or reference to rank all colleges. The ranking scores
are a row vector of
µi
def== (Pi1,Pi2, · · · ,Pin).
The more college j influences i, the higher its ranking score Pij . This way, we define
n sets of ranking scores, µ1,µ2, · · · ,µn. As each college is unique (i.e., not a linear
combination of others), each reference college has its own dimensionality. Thus, we
have n ranking scores on n-dimensional axes, in contrast to merely several axes as in
the rankings by mainstream media.
In contrast to (1), we apply endogenous weighting to the references to combine
these ranking scores µ1, · · · ,µn. Essentially, we let colleges judge colleges themselves
without any external interventions from business interests, mainstream media, adver-
tising, or college administrators. In doing so, we believe that more weight should be
placed on a good reference (i.e., with large pii), and less weight should be placed on
a bad one (i.e., with small pii). Thus, we have weighted ranking scores
n∑
i=1
piiµi = piP .
As the weighted ranking scores also quantify the quality of the schools as references,
piP should be a multiple of pi. By Theorem 2, there exists a unique equation that links
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the endogenously weighted scores piP to a constant multiple of pi; and that equation
is (3). When pi is not assumed to have a unit sum, we can still have the equation
pi = piP as long as the sum of piP does not deviate from that of pi.
Theorem 2 (Uniqueness). If piP = βpi for some β > 0, then β = 1.
4.2 Spillover Effects
The distribution pi takes into consideration the spillover effects of direct influence,
making non-competing colleges comparable and smoothing out controversial compe-
titions so that they become consistent. In a two-step spillover pi = piP = piP 2, for
example,
pii =
n∑
k=1
n∑
z=1
pikPkzPzi,
i has a direct influence on z when Pzi > 0 and z has a direct influence on k when
Pkz > 0. Then, i has an indirect influence on k even if i may have no direct influence
on k; pii collects indirect influence from all players in N. For any integer m> 1, we
may also consider an m-step indirect influence using Pm.
There are many similarities between pi and the invariant measure in the theory of
homogeneous Markov chains. We borrow the concepts of irreducibility and aperiod-
icity from the theory. In general, P satisfies both irreducibility and aperiodicity if we
consider the top 300 U.S. colleges. In the preference survey data, for example, there is
a chain of direct bilateral influence: Northern Virginia Community College (NVCC)
↔ George Mason University ↔ UVA ↔ Harvard. Thus, seemingly unrelated Har-
vard and NVCC establish an indirect influence over each other through spillovers of
up to three steps. Besides, irreducibility and aperiodicity guarantee the convergence
in Algorithm 2. Finally, the solution to
pi = piPm (10)
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is the same as the solution to (3), as stated in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. If P is irreducible and aperiodic, then the solutions to (3) and (10) are
equivalent.
The ranking score pii is college i’s long-run influence in the higher education system
and across all other colleges. A straightforward implication of Theorem 3 is that pi is
invariant to any steps of indirect influence. If we treat Pm as a new power transition
matrix, then conflicts in Pm are less severe than those in P whenever m > 1. As
m→∞, Pm gradually smooths out all conflicts in P . In the long-run in P∞, all rows
are pi, and there are no more conflicts. Moreover, the spillover effects take two further
actions: amplification of real comparative advantages and off-setting of noised ones.
One consequence is that some elite schools have substantial authority compared to
non-elite ones.
4.3 Strategies to Improve pii
For college i, a policy implication from the ranking is how to boost its relative strength
in the higher education system. Both the college and its students can improve pii.
Collaboration with another college may also augment its ranking score.
We introduce a few more notations for the next two theorems. Let In be the
n×n identity matrix and let pi−i be the transpose of pi with pii removed. The column
vector αi takes the ith row of P and then drops its ith element, and the matrix Zi is
the transpose of P with the ith row and the ith column removed. Also, the column
vector γij extracts the jth row from P with the jth element replaced with zero, and
the ith element dropped.
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4.3.1 Unilateral Strategies
At the institutional level, college i could improve its pii by increasing its enrollment
rate Pii. A university can attract its admitted students by such recruiting strategies
as tuition discounts, research opportunities, and scholarships. It could also market
its reputation through college sports and alumni networks. We should not, however,
use the single criterion Pii to rank the colleges —a college could artificially inflate its
enrollment rate by simply admitting non-competitive applicants. Theorem 4 specifies
the exact effect of a small variation of Pii on pi. Derivative (11) measures the response
multiplier of pii for a given small shock of Pii. Not surprisingly, by (12), rising Pii has
a non-positive effect on pij for all j 6= i.
Theorem 4.
dpii
dPii
= pii1−Pii
1′n−1(In−1−Zi)−1αi
1 +1′n−1(In−1−Zi)−1αi
≥ 0 (11)
and
dpi−i
dPii
=− pii
1−Pii (In−1−Zi)
−1αi
1+1′n−1(In−1−Zi)−1αi .
(12)
Therefore, dpijdPii ≤ 0 for all j 6= i.
At the student level, students could share their private information about college
choices on the preference survey websites. A higher pii is in line with the interest
of any student who is committed to enrolling in college i. The student has private
information about his or her personal choices, e.g., enrolling in college i and rejecting
college j. Thus, he or she has a strategy to reveal or not the private information on the
survey websites. If the private information is released, then the jth row of P changes
slightly as Pji increases, but Pjj remains the same. As each choice is counted in pi,
both the school and the student are better off if the private information is revealed,
according to (13) in Theorem 5. Thus, there is no incentive for students to hide the
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private information, i.e., strategyproofness. Derivative (13) also implies that college
i improves pii more when recruiting students from a more competitive college j (i.e.,
with a more significant pij), other things remaining constant.
Theorem 5 (Strategyproofness). For any j 6= i,
dpii
dPji
= pij1−Pji−Pjj
1′n−1(In−1−Zi)−1γij
1 +1′n−1(In−1−Zi)−1αi
≥ 0 (13)
and
dpi−i
dPji
= pij1−Pji−Pjj (In−1−Zi)
−1
[ 1′n−1(In−1−Zi)−1γij
1 +1′n−1(In−1−Zi)−1αi
αi−γij
]
. (14)
4.3.2 Bilateral Cooperation
The counterbalance equilibrium has a mixed cooperative and non-cooperative char-
acter. From the cooperative side, player i would assist j in improving pij whenever
Pji > 0 because pijPji is a component of pii =
n∑
k=1
pikPki. From the non-cooperative
side, as pi1 = 1, an increase of pij may mean a decrease of pii. Thus, the trade-off is
how much player i should assist player j without sacrificing himself or herself.
A relevant policy question is how to identify the cooperators and the competitors
for player i. By (14), dpijdPji may also be positive. If this happens, then colleges i and
j would form a cooperative partnership to improve their relative strength by slightly
increasing Pji. Formation of this partnership does not involve a third party, so it is
easily enforceable. Once the partnership forms, (14) calculates the effects on third
parties. Besides, a third party, say, college k, automatically acts as a battlefield for
the competition between colleges i and j. The reason is that both dpiidPki and
dpij
dPkj are
non-negative according to (13), but Pki directly conflicts with Pkj .
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5 Results From a Miniature Ranking
It is not our intention to generate a new college ranking to compete with the com-
mercial ones. Also, data collection and computational costs are high if we sort all
of approximately 3,000 U.S. colleges. Any truncation of the complete list, however,
distorts the ranking results to some degree. A moderate-sized ranking, based on the
above methodology, should be in real-time and online, changing as often as the data
of revealed preferences. To illustrate the methodology in the last sections, however,
we analyze the twelve colleges in Table 3, using the data from the websites mentioned
above. Table 4 reports the ranks and their .95 confidence bands, ranking scores and
their .95 confidence bands, and means and medians of 20,000 simulated sets of ranking
scores.
Table 4: A Mini Sample College Ranking
College Rank .95 CI Score pˆii .95 CI∗ Mean pˆii Median pˆii
Harvard 1 [1,1] .2770 [.2757, .2784] .2770 .2770
Stanford 2 [2,2] .2037 [.2024, .2049] .2037 .2036
Yale 4 [4,4] .1149 [.1142, .1155] .1148 .1148
Princeton 5 [5,5] .0851 [.0844, .0858] .0851 .0851
MIT 3 [3,3] .1358 [.1347, .1368] .1358 .1358
Chicago 7 [7,7] .0434 [.0430, .0439] .0434 .0434
CalTech 6 [6,6] .0574 [.0567, .0583] .0574 .0574
Berkeley 8 [8,9] .0239 [.0236, .0243] .0239 .0239
Michigan 9 [8,9] .0235 [.0230, .0239] .0235 .0235
UCLA 10 [10,10] .0184 [.0181, .0188] .0184 .0184
UVA 11 [11,11] .0090 [.0087, .0094] .0090 .0090
UNC 12 [12,12] .0079 [.0075, .0084] .0079 .0079
* The .95 confidence intervals (CI) are non-symmetric about pˆii.
As a summary of Table 4, the elite private colleges are far ahead of their elite public
peers. Harvard and Stanford capture nearly half of the total authority, due to the
spillover’s amplification effect. Because of this effect, for example, Harvard’s ranking
score is 40% higher than Stanford’s while their odds ratios are much closer. The
amplification comes from Harvard’s relative advantages over other colleges, compared
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to Stanford’s. Berkeley and Michigan have very close ranking scores; their confidence
intervals overlap by 23%. To separate them effectively, we could add more colleges
to the ranking. We could also perform secondary analyses based on the estimated
ranking scores. Regression of the scores on the tuitions, for example, finds which
universities are undervalued and which are overvalued.
The estimated power transition matrix Pˆ is

HRV SFD Yale PRT MIT CCG CIT UCB Mich UCLA UVA UNC
.7942 .0464 .0411 .0257 .0242 .0167 .0128 .0100 .0132 .0069 .0062 .0026
.0723 .7581 .0402 .0260 .0266 .0158 .0338 .0079 .0090 .0046 .0024 .0032
.1070 .0634 .6753 .0299 .0468 .0196 .0249 .0046 .0148 .0067 .0035 .0036
.1059 .0640 .0514 .6403 .0426 .0215 .0401 .0086 .0089 .0073 .0054 .0040
.0616 .0721 .0281 .0340 .6956 .0177 .0543 .0099 .0099 .0089 .0046 .0033
.0765 .0560 .0905 .0528 .0689 .5221 .0434 .0160 .0446 .0160 .0056 .0076
.0849 .1093 .0288 .0498 .2050 .0329 .3972 .0345 .0210 .0149 .0114 .0104
.0407 .0786 .0522 .0432 .0582 .0377 .0993 .4174 .0229 .1428 .0040 .0030
.0823 .0582 .0544 .0456 .0787 .0867 .1033 .0428 .4061 .0232 .0093 .0094
.0349 .0577 .0344 .0307 .0795 .0344 .1508 .1564 .0229 .3907 .0042 .0033
.0563 .0617 .0443 .1563 .0628 .0714 .0682 .0219 .0232 .0152 .3856 .0330
.0482 .0423 .0464 .1147 .0218 .0369 .0571 .0247 .0405 .0206 .0702 .4767

.
Compared with sij in Table 3, Pˆ also takes the sizes Nij , Ei, and Ai into considera-
tion. The matrix illustrates which college has the most direct influence on college i. In
the first column, for example, Harvard pulls in significant authority from other educa-
tional superpowers such as Yale, Princeton, CalTech, and Michigan, in the decreasing
order of Pi1. By the tenth row, Berkeley, CalTech, MIT, and Stanford are the top four
influencers on UCLA. The direct influence on UNC is the most evenly distributed,
possibly due to its long distance from the other institutions. Duke University may be
added to the list to break the approximate evenness.
Using (11), we calculate the response of pii, in percentage, to the 1% shock of the
enrollment rate Pii, i.e., Piipii
dpii
dPii =
dlogpii
dlogPii . The result is the following vector
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 HRV SFD Yale PRT MIT CCG CIT UCB Mich UCLA UVA UNC
2.79 2.496 1.841 1.629 1.975 1.045 .621 .699 .668 .629 .622 .904
 .
Among the private elites, CalTech has the lowest percentage increase of pii with respect
to a 1% hike in the enrollment rate. Among the public elites, UNC has the highest
sensitivity of pii to the increase of the enrollment rate. For Michigan to catch up with
Berkeley, for example, its pii needs a .0239.0235 −1 = 1.7% increase. This can be achieved
by a 1.7.668 = 2.55% increase in the enrollment rate, other things remaining unchanged.
Being situated at the top of the ranking, Harvard may have no incentive to raise
its enrollment rate, though it also leads in the impulse response vector. Also, the
response function has a wide range, from .621 to 2.79. If an econometric model is
used to model the ranking scores by enrollment rates and other covariates, then the
unknown coefficient for enrollment rates would presumably be a constant across all
the colleges, which is highly artificial, as shown in the above vector. Lastly, one could
also use (12) to find the response of pij , in percentage, to the 1% shock of Pii.
To locate the partners for college i, we look for all j 6= i for which dpijdPji ≥ 0,
according to Theorem 5. We list these partners, calculated from (13) and (14), in the
following matrix:
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
HRV SFD Yale PRT MIT CCG CIT UCB Mich UCLA UVA UNC
2.79 .269
.013
.211
7e−3
2.50 .1573e−4
.114
4e−3
.195
.011
.120
1e−3
.129
3e−4
.086
5e−4
.088
7e−5
.159
1e−4 1.84
.103
2e−3
.105
6e−3
.039
2e−4
.120
1e−3
.073
1e−4
.099
2e−4
1.63 .0787e−4
.085
3e−3
.097
.004
.055
6e−4
.054
8e−4
.058
3e−4
.083
3e−3
.081
2e−3
1.98 .1122e−3
.208
.044
.100
2e−3
.095
2e−3
.111
3e−3
.113
4e−4
1.05 .052
.001
.052
1e−3
.137
.010
.064
9e−4
.044
9e−4
.080
7e−4
.256
.02
.088
1e−4 .621
.148
8e−3
.086
.004
.079
5e−3
.118
8e−4
.144
7e−4
.699 .318
.061
.094
.009
.074
9e−4 .688
.050
5e−4
.039
2e−4
.053
7e−4
.213
.060 .629
.017
4e−4
.015
7e−5 .622
.072
7e−3
.013
5e−6
.012
3e−4
.023
3e−4
.100
6e−3 .904

.
At the ith row and the jth column, the numerator is the response of pii, in percentage,
to the 1% shock of Pji; the denominator is the response of pij , in percentage, to the
same shock. Based on this matrix, the partnership at (j, i) does not automatically
imply a partnership at (i, j). Many partnerships do exist at both (j, i) and (i, j),
for example, (Harvard, Yale), (MIT, CalTech), and (Michigan, Chicago). Three or
more institutions could also form a partnership, such as (Michigan, UVA, UNC) and
(CalTech, UVA, UNC). Lastly, the numbers in the matrix show which partnership is
the favorite one. In the tenth column, for example, UCLA has the largest response
function .061 with Berkeley. Therefore, it would prefer the cooperation with Berkeley
to that with Stanford, Princeton, MIT, or Chicago.
The above accounts of cooperation work only for a small change of P . For a large
perturbation, we could conduct other analyses. For example, in a scenario analysis in
which CalTech hypothetically raises its enrollment rate from the current level 39.72%
to the same level 69.56% as MIT, other things remaining the same, the ranking scores
for this scenario become
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 HRV SFD Yale PRT MIT CCG CIT UCB Mich UCLA UVA UNC
.2761 .1986 .1159 .0842 .1268 .0432 .0737 .0235 .0232 .0185 .0088 .0076
 .
Compared with Table 4, CalTech increases its ranking score by 28% in this scenario.
The increase, however, is still not enough for CalTech to surpass Princeton.
6 Discussion
The authority-based ranking is subject to several vulnerabilities. The survey data
could contain selection bias. For example, STEM (science, technology, engineering,
and mathematics) students may be more likely to create accounts on the websites
of survey data than students majoring in the humanities. This bias would result in
higher ranks for schools with strong STEM programs, according to Theorem 5. An-
other way selection bias may creep in is through herding behaviors of the consumers
of higher education, which compromise their uniqueness. In particular, many con-
sumers have a mindset shaped by mainstream media. As a consequence, the odds
ratios in Table 3 could have already been distorted by other rankings. Secondly, one
arguable assumption we make is that revealed preferences effectively capture the most
important college comparisons. Of course, any additional data would help. Last but
not least, when pˆii and pˆij are too close to show a significant difference, it would be
unfair to rank one higher and the other lower. This is often the case when schools
are ranked below the top 100. Other information may be needed to distinguish them.
Otherwise, we could only list the ranking’s .95 confidence range for each college, which
ranks beyond the top 100.
We could apply the authority-distribution methodology in many similar situations.
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One example, as mentioned in Hu and Shapley (2003), is to sort academic journals.
The only context change is that Pij is the proportion of journal j in all citations
cited by journal i. Journal sizes can be adjusted by their total citations using (9).
Indeed, researchers (e.g., Baltagi, 1998; Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas, and Stengos, 2003
and 2011) have used citation data to rank journals. For another example, we could
consider the relative competitiveness of each currency. In this case, we let Pij be the
proportion of the export to country j in the total production in country i, all in local
currency. This example has a vivid power-in-and-out dynamic. Its results can help
avoid unnecessary trade wars and identify the best trade partners. In sports, a team
is ranked in the news media by how many times it wins throughout the season. This
simple measurement does not account for how strong the opponents were in those
games. A remedy could use the endogenous weighting system (3) so that winning
over a strong opponent counts more than winning over a weak one. It could also
account for by how much that team wins or loses in each game so that each earned
or lost point is reflected in the ranking. After being converted into percentages of
the total points, the earned points versus lost points in a game make a bilateral odds
ratio, like those in Table 3.
How to extend the authority-distribution framework remains a big challenge.
First, one could analyze the properties of matrix P , such as its eigenvalues and eigen-
vectors. If we do not normalize the rows of P , we may solve the equation piP = βpi
for some unknown β > 0. This solution pi is the eigenvector centrality of the network,
which could avoid scaling the enrollment sizes in Section 3.2. In the sample ranking
in Section 5, many other universities not listed in the ranking also have direct impacts
on UCLA, for example. Thus, the tenth row of Pˆ should have a sum of less than
one while the diagonal of Pˆ remains unchanged. The shrinkage of the off-diagonal
sums could solve the data truncation problem when we are only interested in the top
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300 colleges, which have a national reputation. The shrinkage size may negatively
relate to the ranking score pii. For this shrunk matrix, the Perron-Frobenius theorem
(cf. Keener, 1993) asserts the existence of a positive eigenvector. Secondly, any other
data would help provide a more detailed profile of U.S. higher education. One could
use data from the CDS, the NCES, and Avery et al. (2013) to conduct a multivariate
logistic regression to estimate P . Thirdly, one could also study a multiple-dimensional
pi. Another counterbalance equilibrium could address how colleges admit students,
using acceptance and rejection by schools. This facet highly correlates with the one
we study in Sections 2 through 4 and supplements the other side of the story in the
many-to-many matching game. Ignoring the correlation, the solution to this counter-
balance equilibrium measures what types of applicants are competitive in applying
for colleges. However, dealing with qualitative and latent variables, such as recom-
mendation letters, is a big hurdle to cross. Additionally, from a policy viewpoint,
when n is large, we need a fast algorithm to identify the best cooperators and the
worst competitors for each player. Lastly, a consumer could select multiple choices of
alternatives, revealing his or her preference over unselected ones. In approval voting
(e.g., Brams and Fishburn, 1978), for example, a voter can select a few from a short-
list of candidates. Then the ranking scores measure the confidence in the candidates
by the voters.
7 Conclusion
College rankings have emerged because of public demand and intense competition
among institutions of higher learning. They have become as necessary as high school
education counselors and college campus visits. There are numerous college rank-
ings in the United States, the most famous of which are generated by mainstream
media outlets. These publications are supposed to provide useful guidelines for high
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school seniors and help them make the best college choices. However, researches
have found that college rankings often mislead students and distort the landscape
of higher education. We argue that the multiplicity of these rankings is due to the
subjective selection of ranking criteria and the subjective weights on the criteria. The
consequence is to reduce higher education institutions to only one stereotype and to
undermine selection diversity. In contrast, the starting point of our research is to
recognize that each college is different, as is each student. Each adds inclusiveness
value to the educational system. Beyond that, choosing a college could embrace all
aspects of the big data available for that college. Of course, challenges exist regarding
the volume, variety, and veracity of the data, as well as heterogeneity (cf. Fan, Han,
and Liu, 2014).
This paper deals with these challenges. For heterogeneity and variety, we let
each college decide the selection criteria and their weights; we also let each student
decide his or her considerations and their weights. These decisions altogether result in
millions of matching games, in which we observe only a small fraction of the selection
outcomes. Also, revealed preference from each selection is a ranking between two
colleges, derived from an individual’s rational consideration of many factors. Hence,
the preferences together could summarize the most relevant big data about colleges,
eliminating voluminous efforts in data collection and storage for a college ranking
agency. The full preferences revealed in the outcomes, however, warrant no consistent
utility function nor complete linear ordering of the colleges. To resolve this issue,
we apply authority distribution to absorb the spillover effects in the direct bilateral
influence. The result is unique and consistent; the solution mitigates the noise in data
quality by offsetting the inconsistencies in direct bilateral comparisons.
Our ranking method is likely the most authoritative one compared with those
used in popular rankings. First, the results are comprehensive. They are based on
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foot voting by millions of students —each student uses his or her decision function.
Secondly, the method is scientific and objective. We use weighting on colleges, but the
weights are endogenously implied from the weighting system. They are not subjec-
tively determined by a committee, and they are the ranking scores. Finally, it offers
individual rationality and strategyproofness for students. The ranking counts every
rational choice made by students; there is no white noise, as in a regression model.
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Appendix
A1. Proof of Lemma 1
As τ = 1−sij and η is the lower confidence bound in (7),
η = 2sijMij +z
2
2Mij + 2z2
− z2Mij + 2z2
√
4τsijMij +z2.
Therefore
√
4τsijMij +z2 =
2sijMij +z2−2η(Mij +z2)
z
= 2(sij−η)
z
Mij + (1−2η)z.
Next, we square both sides to get
4τsijMij +z2 = 4(sij−η)
2
z2 M
2
ij + 4(sij−η)(1−2η)Mij + (1−2η)2z2
or simply,
(
sij−η
z
)2
M2ij + [(sij−η)(1−2η)− τsij ]Mij−η(1−η)z2 = 0.
The above quadratic equation of Mij has the solution expressed in Lemma 1.
A2. Proof of Theorem 1
The probability density for N˜ij = n˜ij for all j ∈ N is (Ai)!∏
j
(n˜ij)!
∏
j
P
n˜ij
ij and the marginal
probability density for N˜ii = Ei is (Ai)!(Ei)!(Ai−Ei)!P
Ei
ii (1−Pii)Ai−Ei . Thus, given N˜ii =
Ei = n˜ii, the conditional probability density for N˜ij = n˜ij for all j 6= i is
(Ai)!∏
j
(n˜ij)!
∏
j
P
n˜ij
ij
(Ai)!
(Ei)!(Ai−Ei)!P
Ei
ii (1−Pii)Ai−Ei
= (Ai−Ei)!∏
j 6=i
(n˜ij)!
∏
j 6=i
(
Pij
1−Pii
)n˜ij
.
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Therefore, the conditional N˜ij given N˜ii =Ei also has a multinomial distribution, and
the parameters are Ai−Ei and Pij1−Pii ,∀j 6= i.
Let λ be the probability with which any student —admitted by college i— would
participate in the survey. Then, the joint conditional probability of N˜ij = n˜ij and
Nij = nij for all j 6= i is
(Ai−Ei)!∏
j 6=i
(n˜ij)!
∏
j 6=i
(
Pij
1−Pii
)n˜ij ∏
j 6=i

 n˜ij
nij
λnij (1−λ)n˜ij−nij

= (Ai−Ei)!λ
∑
j 6=i
nij
(1−λ)
Ai−Ei−
∑
j 6=i
nij(∑
j 6=i
nij
)
!
(
Ai−Ei−
∑
j 6=i
nij
)
!
×
(∑
j 6=i
(n˜ij−nij)
)
!
∏
j 6=i
(
Pij
1−Pii
)n˜ij−nij
∏
j 6=i
(n˜ij−nij)!
×
(∑
j 6=i
nij
)
!
∏
j 6=i
(
Pij
1−Pii
)nij
∏
j 6=i
(nij)! .
In the above three fractions, the first one is the binomial distribution density for∑
j 6=i
Nij , the total number of admitted students in the survey excluding those in Ei.
The second one is the multinomial distribution density for N˜ij −Nij for all j 6= i,
the admitted students not in the survey also excluding those in Ei. And the third
one is the multinomial density for Nij , conditional on
∑
j 6=i
Nij . Finally, we factor
out the first two fractions to get the conditional marginal density of Nij = nij as(∑
j 6=i
nij
)
!∏
j 6=i
(nij)!
∏
j 6=i
[
Pij
1−Pii
]nij
. This shows that Nij , ∀j 6= i, have a multinomial distribution,
given the observation of
∑
k 6=i
Nik. Therefore, Nij∑
k 6=i
Nik
has a conditional expectation
Pij
1−Pii .
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A3. Proof of Theorem 2
We multiply 1n on both right sides of the equation piP = βpi to get piP1n = βpi1n. As
P1n = 1n and pi1n = 1, we have
β = βpi1n = piP1n = pi1n = 1.
A4. Proof of Theorem 3
When P is irreducible and aperiodic, P t converges as t→∞; and lim
t→∞P
t =1n(ζ1, · · · , ζn)
for some row vector (ζ1, · · · , ζn). Therefore, by (3) and pi1n = 1,
pi = piP = piP 2 = · · ·= lim
t→∞piP
t = pi1n(ζ1, · · · , ζn) = (ζ1, · · · , ζn).
And by (10),
pi = piPm = piP 2m = · · ·= lim
t→∞piP
tm = pi1n(ζ1, · · · , ζn) = (ζ1, · · · , ζn).
A5. Proof of Theorem 4
Let 0n be the n×1 zero vector. When we make a small perturbation ∆P to P , the
new authority distribution pi+ ∆pi satisfies the counterbalance equation of
pi+ ∆pi = (pi+ ∆pi)[P + ∆P ] (A.1)
subject to ∆P1n = 0n and ∆pi1n = 0. After subtracting pi = piP from (A.1), we get
∆pi[In−P −∆P ] = pi∆P and its first-order approximation
∆pi[In−P ]≈ pi∆P. (A.2)
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Without loss of generality, let us increase P11 by ∆P11 and calculate the effect of
the change on pi. Then the elements of ∆P are all zeros except the first row. By (8),
the other elements in the row decrease proportionally. Thus, the first row of ∆P is
(
∆P11,
−∆P11
1−P11P12, · · · ,
−∆P11
1−P11P1n
)
= ∆P11
(
1, −P121−P11 , · · · ,
−P1n
1−P11
)
.
By (A.2), the derivative of pi with respect to P11, i.e. dpidP11 , satisfies
dpi
dP11
[In−P ] = pi dPdP11 = pi1
(
1, −P121−P11 , · · · ,
−P1n
1−P11
)
. (A.3)
Let the row vector βi take the ith column of P and then drop the ith element.
We partition the transpose of P as P ′ =
 P11 β1
α1 Z1
 . To solve dpidP11 from (A.3), we
write the augmented matrix for the identity dpidP111n = 0 and the transpose of (A.3) as
1 1′n−1 0
1−P11 −β1 pi1
−α1 In−1−Z1 −pi11−P11α1
 . If we multiply

1 0 0′n
0 1 1′n−1
0n 0n In−1
 to the left side
of the augmented matrix, then the second row becomes a zero vector. After dropping
the second row, we get the new augmented matrix of
 1 1′n−1 0
−α1 In−1−Z1 −pi11−P11α1
 . (A.4)
We next multiple
 1 −1′n−1(In−1−Z1)−1
0 In−1
 to the left side of (A.4) to get
 1 +1′n−1(In−1−Z1)−1α1 0′n−1 pi11−P111′n−1(In−1−Z1)−1α1
−α1 In−1−Z1 −pi11−P11α1
 . (A.5)
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Note that (In−1−Z1)−1 = In−1 +Z1 +Z21 +Z31 + · · · has all non-negative elements.
Thus, 1′n−1(In−1−Z1)−1α1 ≥ 0. By the first row of (A.5),
dpi1
dP11
= pi11−P11
1′n−1(In−1−Z1)−1α1
1 +1′n−1(In−1−Z1)−1α1
≥ 0.
By the second row of (A.5), − dpi1dP11α1 + (In−1−Z1)
dpi−1
dP11 =
−pi1
1−P11α1 and thus
dpi−1
dP11 = (In−1−Z1)
−1
[
dpi1
dP11 − pi11−P11
]
α1
= − pi1(1−P11)[1+1′n−1(In−1−Z1)−1α1] (In−1−Z1)
−1α1.
Therefore, dpi−1dP11 is a non-positive vector.
A6. Proof of Theorem 5
To show a student’s strategyproofness, without loss of generality, we assume that
the student enrolls in college 1 and rejects college 2. If he or she reveals the private
information in the preference survey, we want the effect of the revelation on pi.
Whether revelation or not, the enrollment rates P11 and P22 do not change because
they are official enrollment data —the enrollment of the student in college 1 is already
counted in P11 and never counted in P22. Though M12 and s12 change with the
revelation, their product N12 remains unchanged because it is the number of students
in the survey who are admitted by college 1 and enroll in college 2. Thus, by (8), the
first row of P does not change with the revelation.
However, the estimated P21 increases. Let P21 have a small change ∆P21. By (8),
∆P has non-zero values only in the second row which is
(
∆P21,0,
−∆P21P23
1−P21−P22 , · · · ,
−∆P21P2n
1−P21−P22
)
= ∆P21
(
1,0, −P231−P21−P22 , · · · ,
−P2n
1−P21−P22
)
.
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By (A.2), the derivative of pi with respect to P21, i.e. dpidP21 , satisfies
dpi
dP21
[In−P ] = pi dPdP21 = pi2
(
1,0, −P231−P21−P22 , · · · ,
−P2n
1−P21−P22
)
. (A.6)
In solving dpidP21 from (A.6), the augmented matrix for
dpi
dP211n = 0 and the transpose
of (A.6) is

1 1′n−1 0
1−P11 −β1 pi2
−α1 In−1−Z1 −pi21−P21−P22γ12
 . We apply the same operations as
in the proof of Theorem 4 to the matrix to get the new augmented matrix
 1 +1′n−1(In−1−Z1)−1α1 0′n−1 pi21−P21−P221′n−1(In−1−Z1)−1γ12
−α1 In−1−Z1 −pi21−P21−P22γ12
 . (A.7)
Therefore, by the first row of (A.7),
dpi1
dP21
= pi21−P21−P22
1′n−1(In−1−Z1)−1γ12
1 +1′n−1(In−1−Z1)−1α1
≥ 0.
By the second row of (A.7), − dpi1dP21α1 + (In−1−Z1)
dpi−1
dP21 =
−pi2
1−P21−P22γ12 and thus
dpi−1
dP21 = (In−1−Z1)
−1
[
dpi1
dP21α1− pi21−P21−P22γ12
]
= (In−1−Z1)−1
[
pi2
1−P21−P22
1′n−1(In−1−Z1)−1γ12
1+1′n−1(In−1−Z1)−1α1α1−
pi2
1−P21−P22γ12
]
= pi21−P21−P22 (In−1−Z1)−1
[ 1′n−1(In−1−Z1)−1γ12
1+1′n−1(In−1−Z1)−1α1α1−γ12
]
.
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